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Abstract
Strong replica consistency is often achieved by writing
deterministic applications, or by using a variety of mech-
anisms to render replicas deterministic. There exists a
large body of work on how to render replicas determinis-
tic under the benign fault model. However, when replicas
can be subject to malicious faults, most of the previous
work is no longer effective. Furthermore, the determin-
ism of the replicas is often considered harmful from the
security perspective and for many applications, their in-
tegrity strongly depends on the randomness of some of
their internal operations. This calls for new approaches
towards achieving replica consistency while preserving
the replica randomness. In this paper, we present two
such approaches. One is based on Byzantine agreement
and the other on threshold coin-tossing. Each approach
has its strength and weaknesses. We compare the perfor-
mance of the two approaches and outline their respective
best use scenarios.
Keywords: Replica Consistency, Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance, Middleware, Threshold Signature, Coin-Tossing
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1 Introduction
Strong replica consistency is an essential property for
replication-based fault tolerant distributed systems. It
can be achieved via a number of different techniques.
In this paper, we investigate the challenges in achiev-
ing integrity-preserving strong replica consistency and
present our solutions for state-machine based Byzantine
fault tolerant systems [3]. While it is widely known that
strong replica consistency can also be achieved through
the systematic-checkpointing technique [12] for nondeter-
ministic applications in the benign fault model, it is gen-
erally regarded as too expensive and it is not suitable for
Byzantine fault tolerance.
The state-machine based approach is one of the funda-
mental techniques in building fault tolerant systems [16].
In this approach, replicas are assumed to be either de-
terministic or rendered-deterministic. There has been a
large body of work on how to render replicas determin-
istic in the presence of replica nondeterminism under the
benign fault model (e.g., [3, 4, 12, 15]). However, when
the replicas can be subject to Byzantine faults, which is
the case for many Internet-based systems, most of the
previous work is no longer effective. Furthermore, the
determinism (or rendered-determinism) of the replicas is
often considered harmful from the security perspective
(e.g., with replication, an adversary can compromise any
of the replicas to obtain confidential information [6]) and
for many applications, their integrity is strongly depen-
dent on the randomness of some of their internal opera-
tions (e.g., random numbers are used for unique identifier
generation in transactional systems and for shuffling cards
in online poker games, and if the randomness is taken
away by a deterministic algorithm to ensure replica con-
sistency, the identifiers or the hands of cards can be made
predictable, which can easily lead to exploit [19, 21]).
This calls for new approaches towards achieving strong
replica consistency while preserving the randomness of
each replica’s operations.
In this paper, we present two alternative approaches
towards our goal. The first one is based on Byzantine
agreement [3] (referred to as the BA-algorithm in this pa-
per) and the other on a threshold coin-tossing scheme [2]
(referred to as the CT-algorithm). Both approaches rely
on a collective determination for decisions involving ran-
domness, and the determination is based on the contri-
butions made by a set of replicas (at least one of which
must be correct), to avoid the problems mentioned above.
They differ mainly by how the collective determination
is carried out. In the BA-algorithm, the replicas first
reach a Byzantine agreement on the set of contributions
from replicas, and then apply a deterministic algorithm
(for all practical purposes, the bitwise exclusive-or oper-
ation [21]) to compute the final random value. The CT-
algorithm uses the threshold coin-tossing scheme intro-
duced in [2] to derive the final random value, without
the need of a Byzantine agreement step. Even though
the CT-algorithm saves on communication cost, it does
incur significant computation overhead due to the CPU-
intensive exponentiation calculations. Consequently, as
we will show in Section 7, the BA-algorithm performs
the best in a Local-Area Network (LAN) environment,
where the CT-algorithm is more appropriate for the Wide-
Area Network (WAN) environment where message pass-
ing is expensive. Furthermore, to ensure the freshness
of the random numbers generated, the replicas using the
BA-algorithm should have access to high entropy sources
(which is relatively easy to satisfy) and the replicas should
be able to refresh their key shares periodically in the CT-
algorithm. For the latter, we envisage that a proactive
threshold signature scheme could be used [1, 7, 8]. How-
ever, the discussion of proactive threshold signature tech-
niques is out of the scope of this paper.
To summarize, we make the following research contri-
butions in this paper:
• We point out the danger and pitfalls of control-
ling replica randomness for the purpose of ensur-
ing replica consistency. Removing randomness from
replica operations (when it is needed) could seriously
compromise the system integrity.
• We propose the use of collective determination of
random numbers contributed from replicas, as a
practical way to reconcile the requirement of strong
replica consistency and the preservation of replica
randomness.
• We present a light-weight, Byzantine agreement
based algorithm to carry out the collective determi-
nation. The BA-algorithm only introduces two ad-
ditional communication steps because the Byzantine
agreement for the collective determination of ran-
dom numbers can be integrated into that for mes-
sage total ordering, as needed by the state-machine
replication. The BA-algorithm is particularly suited
for Byzantine fault tolerant systems operating in the
LAN environment, or where replicas are connected
by high-speed low-latency networks.
• We further present an algorithm that uses the thresh-
old coin-tossing scheme [2] as an alternative method
for collective determination of random numbers. The
coin-tossing scheme is introduced in [2] as an instru-
mental mechanism for a group of replicas to reach
Byzantine agreement in asynchronous systems. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to show its usefulness in helping to ensure strong
replica consistency without compromising the sys-
tem integrity.
• We conduct extensive experiments, in both a LAN
testbed and an emulated WAN environment, to thor-
oughly characterize the performance of the two ap-
proaches.
2 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
In this section, we introduce the system model for our
work, and the practical Byzantine fault tolerance algo-
rithm (BFT algorithm, for short) developed by Castro and
Liskov [3] as necessary background information.
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Byzantine fault tolerance refers to the capability of a
system to tolerate Byzantine faults. It can be achieved by
replicating the server and by ensuring that all server repli-
cas reach an agreement on the total ordering of clients’
requests despite the existence of Byzantine faulty repli-
cas and clients. Such an agreement is often referred to as
Byzantine agreement [11].
In recent several years, a number of efficient Byzantine
agreement algorithms [3, 9, 20] have been proposed. In
this work, we focus on the BFT algorithm and use the
same system model as that in [3].
The BFT algorithm operates in an asynchronous dis-
tributed environment. The safety property of the algo-
rithm, i.e., all correct replicas agree on the total ordering
of requests, is ensured without any assumption of syn-
chrony. However, to guarantee liveness, i.e., for the algo-
rithm to make progress towards the Byzantine agreement,
certain synchrony is needed. Basically, it is assumed that
the message transmission and processing delay has an
asymptotic upper bound. This bound is dynamically ex-
plored in the algorithm in that each time a view change
occurs, the timeout for the new view is doubled.
The BFT algorithm is executed by a set of 3f +1 repli-
cas to tolerate up to f Byzantine faulty replicas. One of
the replicas is designated as the primary while the rest are
backups. Each replica is assigned a unique id i, where i
varies from 0 to 3f . For view v, the replica whose id i
satisfies i = v mod (3f + 1) would serve as the primary.
The view starts from 0. For each view change, the view
number is increased by one and a new primary is selected.
The normal operation of the BFT algorithm involves
three phases. During the pre-prepare phase, the primary
multicasts a pre-prepare message containing the client’s
request, the current view and a sequence number assigned
to the request to all backups. A backup verifies the re-
quest and the ordering information. If the backup ac-
cepts the pre-prepare message, it multicasts a prepare
message containing the ordering information and the di-
gest of the request being ordered. This starts the prepare
phase. A replica waits until it has collected 2f match-
ing prepare messages from different replicas, and the pre-
prepare message, before it multicasts a commit message
to other replicas, which starts the commit phase. The
commit phase ends when a replica has collected 2f + 1
matching commit messages from different replicas (pos-
sibly including the one sent or would have been sent by
itself). At this point, the request message has been totally
ordered and it is ready to be delivered to the server appli-
cation once all previous requests have been delivered.
All messages exchanged among the replicas, and those
between the replicas and the clients are protected by an
authenticator [3] (for multicast messages), or by a mes-
sage authentication code (MAC) (for point-to-point com-
munications). An authenticator is formed by a number of
MACs, one for each target of the multicast. We assume
that the replicas and the clients each has a public/private
key pair, and the public keys are known to everyone.
These keys are used to generate symmetric keys needed
to produce/verify authenticators and MACs. To ensure
freshness, the symmetric keys are periodically refreshed
by the mechanism described in [3]. We assume that the
adversaries have limited computing power so that they
cannot break the security mechanisms described above.
Furthermore, we assume that a faulty replica cannot
transmit the confidential state, such as the random num-
bers collectively determined, to its colluding clients in
real time. This can be achieved by using an application-
level gateway, or a privacy firewall as described by Yin et
al.[20], to filter out illegal replies. A compromised replica
may, however, replace a high entropy source to which it
retrieves random numbers with a deterministic algorithm,
and convey such an algorithm via out-of-band or covert
channels to its colluding clients.
3 Pitfalls in Controlling Replica
Randomness
In this section, we analyze a few well-known approaches
possibly be used to ensure replica consistency in the pres-
ence of replica randomness. We show that they are not
robust against Byzantine faulty replicas and clients.
For replicas that use a pseudo-random number genera-
tor, they can be easily rendered deterministic by ensuring
that they use the same seed value to initialize the gen-
erator. One might attempt to use the sequence number
assigned to the request as the seed. Even though this
approach is perhaps the most economical way to render
replicas deterministic (since no extra communication step
is needed and no extra information is to be included in
the control messages for total ordering of requests), it vir-
3
tually takes the randomness away from the fault tolerant
systems. In the presence of Byzantine clients, the vulner-
ability can be exploited to compromise the integrity of the
system. For example, a Byzantine faulty client in an on-
line poker game can simply try out different integer values
as the seed to the pseudo-random generator (if it is known
to the client) to guess the hands of the cards in the dealer
and compare with the ones it has gotten. The client can
then place its bets accordingly and gain unfair advantage.
A seemingly more robust approach is to use the times-
tamp as the seed to the pseudo-random number genera-
tor. As shown in [19, 21], the use of timestamp does
not offer more robustness to the system because it can
also be guessed by Byzantine faulty clients. Furthermore,
the use of timestamp imposes serious challenges in asyn-
chronous distributed systems because of the requirement
that all replicas must use the same timestamp to seed the
pseudo-random number generator. In [3], a mechanism is
proposed to handle this problem by asking the primary
to piggyback its timestamp, to be used by backups as
well, with the pre-prepare message. However, the issue
is that the backups have very limited ways of verifying
the timestamp proposed (other than that the timestamp
must be monotonically increasing) without resorting to
strong synchrony assumptions (such as bounds on pro-
cessing and message passing).
The only option remaining seems to be the use of a truly
random number to seed the pseudo-random number gen-
erator (or to obtain random numbers entirely from a high
entropy source). We note that the elegant mechanism de-
scribed in [3] cannot be used in this case because backups
have no means to verify whether the number proposed by
the primary is taken from a high-entropy source, or is gen-
erated according to a deterministic algorithm. If the latter
is the case, the Byzantine faulty primary could continue
colluding with Byzantine faulty clients without being de-
tected.
Therefore, we believe the most effective way in coun-
tering such threats is to collectively determine the random
number, based on the contributions from a set of replicas
so that Byzantine faulty replicas cannot influence the final
outcome. The set size depends on the algorithms used,
as we will show in the next two sections, but it must be
greater than the number of faulty replicas tolerated (f ) by
the system.
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Figure 1: Normal operation of the BA-algorithm.
4 The BA-Algorithm
The normal operation of the BA-algorithm is illustrated
in Figure 1. As can be seen, the collective-determination
mechanism is seamlessly integrated into the original BFT
algorithm. On ordering a request, the primary deter-
mines the order of the request (i.e., assigns a sequence
number to the request), and queries the application for
the type of operation associated with the request. If the
operation involves with a random number as input, the
primary activates the mechanism for the BA-algorithm.
The primary then obtains its share of random number by
extracting from its own entropy source, and piggybacks
the share with the pre-prepare message multicast to all
backups. The pre-prepare message has the form <PRE-
PREPARE,v, n, d, Rp>αp, where v is the view number, n
is the sequence number assigned to the request, d is the
digest of the request, Rp is the random number generated
by the primary, and αp is the authenticator for the mes-
sage.
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup per-
forms the usual chores such as the verification of the au-
thenticator before it accepts the message. It also checks
if the request will indeed trigger a randomized opera-
tion, to prevent a faulty primary from putting unneces-
sary loads on correct replicas (which could lead to a de-
nial of service attack). If the pre-prepare message is
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acceptable, the replica creates a pre-prepare certificate
for storing the relevant information, generates a share of
random number from its entropy source, and multicasts
to all replicas a pp-update message, in the form <PP-
UPDATE,v, n, i, Ri, d>αi, where i is the sending replica
identifier, Ri is the random number contributed by replica
i.
When the primary has collected 2f pp-update mes-
sages, it combines the random numbers received accord-
ing to a deterministic algorithm (referred to as the entropy
combination step in Figure 1), and builds a pp-update
message with slightly different content than those sent by
backups. In the pp-update message sent by the primary,
the Ri component is replaced by a set of 2f + 1 tuples
containing the random numbers contributed by replicas
(possibly including its own share), SR. Each tuple has
the form <Ri, i>. The replica identifier is included in the
tuple to ease the verification of the set at backups.
On receiving a pp-update message, a backup accepts
the message and stores the message in its data structure
provided that the message has a correct authenticator, it is
in view v and it has accepted a pre-prepare message to or-
der the request with the digest d and sequence number n.
A backup proceeds to the entropy combination step only if
(1) it has accepted a pp-update message from the primary,
and (2) 2f pp-update messages sent by the replicas refer-
enced in the set SR. The backup requests a retransmission
from the primary for any missing pp-update message.
After the entropy combination step is completed,
a backup multicasts a prepare message in the form
<PREPAREv, n, i, d′>αi, where d′ is the digest of the re-
quest concatenated by the combined random number.
When a replica has completed the entropy combination
step, and it has collected 2f valid prepare messages from
different replicas (possibly including the message sent or
would have been sent by itself), it multicasts to all replicas
a commit message in the form <COMMITv, n, i, d′>αi.
When a replica receives 2f + 1 valid commit messages,
it decides on the sequence number and the collectively
determined random number. At the time of delivery to the
application, both the request and the random number are
passed to the application.
In Figure 1, the duration of the entropy extraction and
combination steps have been intentionally exaggerated
for clarify. In practice, the entropy combination can be
achieved by applying a bitwise exclusive-or operation on
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the set of random numbers collected, which is very fast.
The cost of entropy extraction depends on the scheme
used. Some schemes, such as the TrueRand method [10],
allows very prompt entropy extraction. TrueRand works
by gathering the underlying randomness from a computer
by measuring the drift between the system clock and the
interrupts-generation rate on the processor.
5 The CT-Algorithm
The normal operation of the CT-algorithm is shown in
Figure 2. The CT-algorithm is the same as the BFT al-
gorithm in the first two phases (i.e., pre-prepare and pre-
pare phases). The commit phase is modified by incor-
porating threshold coin-tossing operations. Most existing
(k, l) threshold signature schemes [1, 5, 7, 8, 14] can be
used for the CT-algorithm, where k is the threshold num-
ber of signature shares needed to produce the group sig-
nature, and l = 3f + 1 is the total number of players
(i.e., replicas in our case) participating the threshold sign-
ing. In most (k, l) threshold signature schemes, a correct
group signature can be derived by combining shares from
k = t + 1 players, where t = f is the maximum num-
ber of corrupted players tolerated. Some schemes, such
as the RSA-based scheme in [14], allow the flexibility of
using up to k = l − t as the minimum number of shares
required to produce the group signature. Since l = 3f+1
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in our work, k can be set as high as 2f + 1. This prop-
erty offers additional protection against Byzantine faulty
replicas [14].
At the beginning of the commit phase, each replica gen-
erates its share of threshold signature by signing <d||n>
using its private key share, where d is the digest of
the request message and n is the sequence number as-
signed to the request. This operation is referred to as the
share-generation step in Figure 2. The signature share
is piggybacked with the commit message, in the form
<COMMITv, n, i, d, T (d||n, i)>αi, where T (d||n, i) is
the replica i’s share of threshold signature.
When a replica has collected 2f+1 valid commit mes-
sages from different replicas, it executes the shares-
combination step by combining k threshold signature
shares piggybacked with the commit messages. After
the shares have been combined into a group signature,
it is mapped into a random number, first by hashing the
group signature with a secure hash function (e.g., SHA1),
and then by taking the first group of most significant bits
from the hash according to the type of numbers needed,
e.g., 32bits. The random number will be delivered to-
gether with the request to the application, when all pre-
vious requests have been delivered.
6 Informal Proof of Correctness
In this section, we provide an informal argument on the
correctness of our two algorithms. The correctness crite-
ria for the algorithms are:
C1 All correct replicas deliver the same random num-
ber to the application together with the associated
request, and
C2 The random number is secure (i.e., it is truly random)
in the presence of up to f Byzantine faulty replicas.
We first argue for the BA-algorithm. C1 is guaranteed
by the use of Byzantine agreement algorithm. C2 is en-
sured by the collection of 2f + 1 shares contributed by
different replicas, and by a sound entropy combination al-
gorithm (e.g., by using the bitwise exclusive-or operation
on the set to produce the combined random number). By
collecting 2f + 1 contributions, it is guaranteed that at
least f + 1 of them are from correct replicas, so faulty
replicas cannot completely control the set.1 The entropy
combination algorithm ensures that the combined random
number is secure as long as at least one share is secure.
The bitwise exclusive-or operation could be used to com-
bine the set and it is provably secure for this purpose [21].
Therefore, the BA-algorithm satisfies both C1 and C2.
Next we argue for the CT-algorithm. C1 is guaranteed
by the following fact: (1) The same message (<d||n>)
is signed by all correct replicas, according to the CT-
algorithm. (2) The threshold signature algorithm guaran-
tees the production of the same group signature by com-
bining k shares. Different replicas could obtain different
set of k shares and yet they all lead to the same group sig-
nature. (3) The same secure hash function is used to hash
the group signature. C2 is guaranteed by the threshold
signature algorithm. For the threshold signature algorithm
used in our implementation, its security is ensured by the
random oracle model [14]. Therefore, the CT-algorithm
is correct as well. This completes our proof.
7 Performance Characterization
The BA-algorithm and the CT-algorithm have been imple-
mented and incorporated into a Java-based BFT frame-
work. The Java-based BFT framework is developed in
house and it is ported from the C++ based BFT frame-
work of Castro and Liskov [3]. Due to space limita-
tion, the details of the framework implementation is omit-
ted. The CT-algorithm uses Shoup’s threshold signature
scheme [14], implemented by Steve Weis and made avail-
able at SourceForge [18].
The development and test platform consists of a group
of Dell SC440 servers each is equipped with a PentiumD
processor of 2.8GHz and 1GB of RAM running SuSE
10.2 Linux. The nodes are connected via a 100Mbps
LAN. As we noted earlier, the WAN experiments are em-
ulated by introducing artificial delays in communication,
without injecting message loss.
To character the cost of the two algorithms, we use
an echo application with fixed 1KB-long requests and
replies. The server is replicated at four nodes, and hence,
1The use of f + 1 shares are all that needed for this purpose. How-
ever, collecting more shares is more robust in cases when some correct
replicas use low-entropy sources. This is analogous to the benefit of
Shoup’s threshold signature scheme [14].
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Operation
Type
Signing
/Generation
Verification
/Combination
MAC 24.1 µs 237.3 µs
Authenticator 80.2µs 892.0µs
CT2-64 2.2ms 4.6ms
CT2-128 7.1ms 12.8ms
CT2-256 31.7ms 58.5ms
CT2-512 179.1ms 338.2ms
CT2-1024 1191.7ms 1381.4ms
CT3-64 2.2ms 5.6ms
CT3-128 7.1ms 18.5ms
CT3-256 31.7ms 80.0ms
CT3-512 179.1ms 449.7ms
CT3-1024 1191.7ms 2292.1ms
Table 1: Execution time for basic cryptographic opera-
tions involved with our algorithms. The data shown for
CT signing is for a single share.
f = 1 in all our measurements. Up to 12 concurrent
clients are launched across the remaining nodes (at most
one client per node). Each client issues consecutive re-
quests without any think time. For the CT-algorithm,
we vary a number of parameters, including the threshold
value and the key length. We also experiment with certain
optimizations. For all measurements, the end-to-end la-
tency is measured at the client and the throughput is mea-
sured at the replicas. The Java System.nanoTime()
API is used for all timing-related measurements.
7.1 Cost of Cryptographic Operations
We first report the mean execution latency of basic crypto-
graphic operations involved in the BA-algorithm and the
CT-algorithm because such information is beneficial to
the understanding of the behaviors we observe. The la-
tency cost is obtained when running a single client and 4
server replicas in the LAN testbed. The results are sum-
marized in Table 1. As can be seen, the threshold signa-
ture operations are quite expensive, and it is impractical
to use a key as large as 1024bit-long.
Without any optimization (and without fault), an end-
to-end remote call from a client to the replicated server
using the original BFT algorithm involves a total of 4
authenticator generation operations (Ag), 5 authenticator
verification operations (Av) (one does not need to ver-
ify the message sent by itself), 1 MAC generation oper-
ation (Mg) and 2 MAC verification operation (Mv) on the
critical execution path (i.e., Ag + Av for request send-
ing and receiving, Ag + Av for the pre-prepare phase,
Ag +Av for the prepare phase, Ag +2Av for the commit
phase, and Mg + 2Mv for the reply sending and receiv-
ing). The BA-algorithm introduces two additional com-
munication steps and 2 Ag and 3 Av on the critical path.
The CT-algorithm does not require any additional com-
munication step, but introduces 1 threshold signing oper-
ation (Ts) and 1 operation for threshold shares verification
and combination (Tv). From this analysis, the minimum
end-to-end latency achievable using the BA-algorithm is
LminBA = 6Ag + 8Av + Mg + 2Mv (a replica can pro-
ceed to the next step as soon as it receives 1 valid prepare
message from other replica in the prepare phase, and 2
valid commit messages from other replicas in the com-
mit phase, and the client can proceed to deliver the reply
as soon as it has gotten 2 consistent replies). Similarly,
the minimum latency using the CT-algorithm is LminCT =
4Ag +5Av +Mg +2Mv +Ts +Tv. Based on the values
given in Table 1, LminBA = 8.1ms and LminCT = 12.1ms
for k = 2 and 64bit-long key. The minimum overhead in-
curred by the BA-algorithm is 2Ag + 3Av = 2.8ms and
that by the CT-algorithm is Ts + Tv = 6.8ms for k = 2
and 64bit-long key.
7.2 LAN Experimental Results
Figure 3 shows the summary of the experimental results
obtained in the LAN testbed. The end-to-end latency
(plotted in log-scale) measured at a single client under
various configurations is shown in Figure 3(a). As a ref-
erence, the latency for the BFT system without the ad-
ditional mechanisms described in this paper is shown as
“Base”. In the figure, the result for the BA-algorithm is
shown as “BA”, and the results for the CT-algorithm with
different parameter settings are labeled as CT#-i, where #
is the k value, and i is the key length. As can be seen,
only if a very short key is used, the CT-algorithm incurs
significant overhead. Furthermore, the observed end-to-
end latency results are in-line with the analysis provided
in the previous subsection.
The throughput measurement results shown in Fig-
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Figure 3: LAN measurement results. (a) End-to-end
latency under various configurations. (b) The system
throughput in the presence of different number of con-
current clients. (c) End-to-end latency as a function of the
load on the system (throughput).
ure 3(b) are consistent with those in the end-to-end
latency measurements. The results labeled with “no
batching” are obtained for the original CT-algorithm de-
scribed in Section 5, i.e., one coin-tossing operation
(i.e., threshold share signing, combination and verifica-
tion of k shares) is used for every request. Those labeled
with “with batching” are measured when the requests are
batched (for total ordering, they all share the same se-
quence number [3]) and only one coin-tossing operation
is used for the entire batch of requests. As can be seen
from Figure 3(b), the gain in throughput is significant with
the batching optimization. However, if sharing the same
random number among several requests is a concern, this
optimization must be disabled.
For the BA-algorithm, the communication steps for
reaching a Byzantine agreement on the set of random
numbers are automatically batched together with that for
requests total-ordering. Batching the Byzantine agree-
ment for a set of random numbers does not seem to in-
troduce any vulnerability. The additional optimization of
one set of entropy extraction and combination per batch of
requests does not have any noticeable performance bene-
fit. Therefore, it is advised that this further optimization
not to be considered in practice due to possible security
concerns.
Figure 3(c) shows the end-to-end latency as a function
of the load on the system in the presence of concurrent
clients. We use the system throughput as a metric for the
system load because it better reflects the actual load on
the system than the number of clients. It is also useful
to compare with the results in the WAN experiments. As
can be seen, for the CT-algorithm, without the batching
optimization, the latency increases very sharply with the
load, due to the CPU intensive threshold signature com-
putations.
The results for the CT-algorithm with keys larger than
64bits are omitted in Figure 3(b) and (c) to avoid clutter-
ing. The throughput is significantly lower and the end-to-
end latency is much higher than those of the BA-algorithm
in these configurations, especially when the load is high.
7.3 WAN Experimental Results
The experimental results obtained in an emulated WAN
environment are shown in Figure 4. The observed metrics
and the parameters used are identical to those in the LAN
experiments. As can be seen in Figure 4(a), the end-to-
end latency as perceived by a single client is similar for
the BA-algorithm and the CT-algorithm with a key size up
to 256bits (for either k = 2 or k = 3). This can be easily
understood because the end-to-end latency is dominated
by the communication delays, as indicated by the end-to-
end latency for the base system included in the figure.
Figure 4(b) shows part of the measurement results on
system throughput under different number of concurrent
clients. To avoid cluttering, only the results for k = 2 and
key sizes of up to 256bits are shown . The throughput for
the base system is included as a reference. As can be seen,
when batching for the coin-tossing operation is enabled,
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Figure 4: Emulated WAN measurement results. (a) End-
to-end latency under various configurations. (b) The sys-
tem throughput in the presence of different number of
concurrent clients. (c) End-to-end latency as a function
of the load on the system (throughput).
the CT-algorithm with short-to-medium sized keys out-
performs the BA-algorithm. When batching is disabled,
however, the BA-algorithm performs better unless very
small key is used for the CT-algorithm. The end-to-end
latency results shown in Figure 4(c) confirm the trend.
8 Related Work
How to ensure strong replica consistency in the presence
of replica nondeterminism has been of research interest
for a long time, especially for fault tolerant systems using
the benign fault model [3, 4, 12, 15]. However, while the
importance of the use of good random numbers has long
been recognized in building secure systems [19], we have
yet to see substantial research work on how to preserve
the randomized operations necessary to ensure the system
integrity in a fault tolerant system. For the type of sys-
tems where the use of random numbers is crucial to their
service integrity, the benign fault model is obviously inad-
equate and the Byzantine fault model must be employed
if fault tolerance is required.
In the recent several years, significant progress has
been made towards building practical Byzantine fault tol-
erant systems, as shown in the series of seminal papers
such as [3, 4, 9, 20]. This makes it possible to address
the problem of reconciliation of the requirement of strong
replica consistency and the preservation of each replica’s
randomness for real-world applications that requires both
high availability and high degree of security. We believe
the work presented in this paper is an important step to-
wards solving this challenging problem.
We should note that some form of replica nondeter-
minism (in particular, replica nondeterminism related to
timestamp operations) has been studied in the context
Byzantine fault tolerant systems [3, 4]. However, we have
argued in previous sections that the existing approach is
vulnerable to the presence of colluding Byzantine faulty
replicas and clients.
The main idea of this work, i.e., collective determina-
tion of random values based on the contributions made
by the replicas, is borrowed from the design principles
for secure communication protocols [17]. However, the
application of this principle in solving the strong replica
consistency problem is novel.
The CT-algorithm is inspired by the work of Cachin,
Kursawe and Shoup [2], in particular, the idea of exploit-
ing threshold signature techniques for agreement. How-
ever, we have adapted this idea to solve a totally differ-
ent problem, i.e., it is used towards reaching integrity-
preserving strong replica consistency. Furthermore, we
carefully studied what to sign for each request so that the
final random number obtained is not vulnerable to attacks.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented our work on reconciling the re-
quirement of strong replica consistency and the desire of
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maintaining each replica’s individual randomness. Based
on the central idea of collective determination of ran-
dom values needed by the applications for their service
integrity, we designed and implemented two algorithms.
The first one, the BA-algorithm, is based on reaching a
Byzantine agreement on a set of random number shares
provided by 2f + 1 replicas. The second one, the CT-
algorithm, is based on threshold signature techniques. We
thoroughly characterized the performance of the two al-
gorithms in both a LAN testbed and an emulated WAN
environment. We show that the BA-algorithm in general
out-performs the CT-algorithm in most cases except in
WAN operations under relatively light load. Furthermore,
the overhead incurred by the BA-algorithm with respect
to the base BFT system is relatively small, making it pos-
sible for practical use.
Future research work will focus on the threshold key
share refreshment issue for the CT-algorithm. To en-
sure long-term robustness of the system, the key shares
must be proactively refreshed periodically. Otherwise, the
random numbers generated this way may age over time,
which may open the door for attacks. The threshold signa-
ture algorithm used in this work [14] does not have built-
in mechanism for key share refreshment. We will explore
other threshold signature algorithms that offer this capa-
bility [1, 7, 8].
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